Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ

The evaluation concluded that:

• The policy framed and guided the development of Â鶹³ÉÈ˰桯s various emergency preparedness work streams, although limited conceptual clarity hindered the policy¡¯s alignment with other Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ efforts on disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, and resilience. 
• While responsibilities stipulated in the policy were duly met across Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ, reflecting the cross-functional nature of emergency preparedness, gaps in coordination and guidance led to fragmentation.
• Overstretched resources limited Â鶹³ÉÈ˰桯s ability to implement the policy. Diverse mechanisms for accessing funds, stocks and surge personnel for preparedness enabled Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ to act quickly and flexibly, but constraints in accessing advance financing to invest in preparedness exist. 
• Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ increased the capacity of its personnel for preparedness, early action and response, but there is room to improve its surge capacity mechanisms. 
• Substantial efforts were made to strengthen governments¡¯ emergency preparedness, improving capacities and skills in diverse sectors, whereas results at community level were less visible.
• Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ needs to leverage on its comparative advantages in emergency preparedness, with stronger internal prioritization and more flexible funding.
• More robust evidence on the effects of preparedness would strengthen the case for greater investments in this area and support resource mobilization.
• To fully integrate a gender-sensitive approach and disability inclusion in preparedness work, Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ would require a better understanding of underlying inequalities.
• Â鶹³ÉÈË°æ made considerable contributions to collective preparedness efforts, particularly through partnerships with national governments and the work of global humanitarian clusters. On the other hand, partnerships with private sector, cooperating partners and development actors lacked clear direction.